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Private Law, Conflict of Laws, and a Lex Mercatoria of Standards-
Development Organizations 
Jorge L. Contreras* 
 
1. Introduction: Standards, SDOs and Conflict of Laws 
The development of technical standards such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB has 
been conducted largely within private industry associations known as 
standards-development organizations or SDOs.  While an SDO provides an open 
forum for standards development, the technical work of standardization is 
generally carried out by representatives of firms having expertise in the relevant 
technical field: namely, technology developers and manufactures of standardized 
products, with the occasional involvement of governmental entities and civil 
society members.  
 
The standards that emerge from SDOs enable products manufactured by 
different producers around the world to interoperate without significant user 
intervention.  Large swaths of the global technology infrastructure not only 
depend on, but are literally defined by, these standards. As such, SDOs have been 
characterized as private regulators with significant public functions.1  And while 
a range of national and international legal regimes -- including trade law, 
antitrust and competition law and national standardization regulations -- impose 
constraints on SDO behavior, generally requiring that they observe minimal “due 
process” requirements, the structure and governance of SDOs remains primarily 
a function of private ordering among their members.2  
 
SDOs assume a range of forms, from non-profit corporations to trade 
associations to contractual consortia to international non-governmental 
organizations.3 In each of these cases, the rules that govern the standardization 
process, as well as the rights and responsibilities of SDO participants, are 
codified in written instruments known variously as bylaws, memoranda of 
understanding, membership agreements, operating procedures, and the like. 
These policy instruments specify the procedures to be used in proposing, 
developing, and approving technical standards, as well as means for resolving 
disputes among SDO participants and the manner in which the SDO itself is 
governed (e.g., through elected or appointed bodies having specified authority).   
                                                        
* Jorge L. Contreras is Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  The author is 
grateful to Anna Beckers, Tim Lytton, Rob van Gestel, Paul Verbruggen, Dan Wielsch and the other 
participants at the Regulating Private Regulators conference held at Tilburg University in May 2018, and the 
2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC) at University of California, Berkeley, for their helpful 
comments and feedback on this paper. 
1 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Framework Governing Standards-
Essential Patents”, 30. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 2017, p. (211); T. BÜTHE & W. MATTLI, The New 
Global Rulers. The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2011). 
2 For an in-depth review of the exogenous legal constraints affecting SDOs, see J.A. BARON et al., “Making the 
Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property 
Rights”, JRC Science for Policy Report at § 4.1 (2019). 
3 See, generally, B. BIDDLE, “No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT Standards-Development 
Ecosystem” in J. Contreras (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law, Volume I: 
Competition, Antitrust and Patents (New York: Cambridge University Press 2017), pp. 17-28 (discussing 
ecosystem of standards development). 
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Despite the international composition of SDO membership, each SDO is also 
organized as a legal entity in a particular jurisdiction (e.g., a U.S. state, a 
European country, or another jurisdiction).  As such, different SDO’s policies are 
subject to a range of national laws.4  Likewise, when disputes regarding SDO 
policy are litigated in national courts, different national laws are applied to the 
adjudication of those disputes.5  While the application of national law to private 
undertakings may, at first glance, seem unremarkable, it has presented 
unanticipated and difficult issues in the context of SDOs.  Several factors have 
contributed to these difficulties.  First, many SDOs have policies covering 
identical concepts, such as the requirement to license certain patents on terms 
that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND).  Yet the national 
laws governing these SDO policies, as well as judicial approaches to contract 
interpretation and construction, may differ significantly.6 Second, many disputes 
concerning SDO policies are adjudicated in jurisdictions other than those whose 
laws govern the SDO’s policies, requiring different courts to make decisions on 
matters of foreign law.  What’s more, none of those courts coordinate their 
decisions or legal interpretations, giving rise to a cacophony of different 
interpretations of virtually the same SDO policy provisions.  
 
This interpretive disharmony has created uncertainty in the marketplace and 
unpredictability in the resolution of disputes.7 The central question raised by 
this article is whether a uniform body of interpretations of SDO policy provisions 
can be developed based on industry practice and understanding, rather than the 
application of national law.  In essence, a lex mercatoria, or common lexicon, of 
technical standardization. As such, the privately derived understandings of 
participants in the standard-setting process can supersede, and be adopted into, 
national law, just as private models of governance came to supersede applicable 
legal regulations in the area of mercantile law and other contexts.8 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 See T. BARTLEY, “Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private 
Standards”, 12. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2011, p. (517), at 521 (“implementation of […] standards always 
occurs within a particular nation-state, where domestic law still holds sway”). 
5 For a summary of FRAND-related litigation around the world, see C. PENTHEROUDAKIS & J. A. BARON, Licensing 
Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases. JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 
28302 (2017).  This paper focuses largely on cases and disputes in the U.S. and Europe (principally UK and 
Germany), as these are the jurisdictions that have seen the greatest level of FRAND litigation. 
6 See, e.g., P. VERBRUGGEN, "Private Regulatory Standards in Commercial Contracts: Questions of Compliance", 
in: R. Brownsword, R. van Gestel & H. Micklitz (eds), Contract and Regulation: A Handbook on New Methods 
of Law Making in Private Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2017), pp. 284-322, at 312 (“what normative 
theory a court will apply [to interpret a contract] will of course depend on law applicable to the contract 
under the rules of private international law”). 
7 This disharmony has been noted as a feature of international legal regimes, more generally. See B. M. 
CREMADES & S. L. PLEHN, “The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International 
Commercial Transactions” 2. Boston University International Law Journal 1984, p. (317), at 320 (“today’s 
nations realize that piecemeal regulation of international commerce through the application of independent 
national laws impedes the growth of international trade”). 
8 See, e.g., BARTLEY (n 4), at 518-19 (reviewing literature on private governance as filling regulatory voids in 
areas such as labor and environment). See n 75, infra, and accompanying text, discussing assimilation of lex 
mercatoria into national commercial law. 
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2. SDO Policies – Patents and FRAND 
In recent years, one of the most contentious areas of SDO rulemaking has 
concerned intellectual property, particularly with regard to patents that are 
considered “essential” for a product to comply with a standard (so-called 
“standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”).9  There is a large and varied theoretical 
literature concerning the potential effects that SEPs may have on markets for 
standards-compliant products.10 One of the principal areas of debate concerns 
whether SEP owners can and do “hold-up” the market by demanding excessive 
royalty rates after a standard has been widely adopted and manufacturers have 
made substantial capital investments in the standardized technology (thus 
becoming “locked-in”).11 Another potential issue is “royalty stacking,” which, as 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained, can occur “when a 
standard implicates numerous patents, perhaps hundreds, if not thousands,” 
each of which can bear a royalty and which “may become excessive in the 
aggregate.”12 
 
Many SDOs have adopted policies designed to mitigate the threats of patent hold-
up and stacking. These policies fall into two general categories which are not 
mutually exclusive: disclosure policies and licensing policies.13 Disclosure 
policies require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that they hold, generally prior 
to the approval of a relevant standard. Licensing policies require SEP holders to 
grant manufacturers of standardized products licenses on terms that are either 
royalty-free or bear royalties that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” 
(FRAND).14 
 
Initially, these policies were relatively brief and abstract, requiring, for example, 
only that “[s]tandards should not include items whose production is covered by 
patents unless the patent holder agrees to and does make available to any 
interested and qualified party a license on reasonable terms . . .”15 These loosely 
specified policies remained in effect through the 1990s when they began to 
attract greater scrutiny from litigants and courts. The situation came to a head in 
2003, when semiconductor designer Rambus, Inc. avoided liability for failing to 
                                                        
9 A patent is generally considered to be “essential” to a standard if the claims of the patent must be infringed 
by any product that complies with the standard.  See, generally, J. L. CONTRERAS, “Essentiality and Standards-
Essential Patents” in CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 209-230 (discussing essentiality). 
10 See, e.g., J. L. CONTRERAS, “Technical Standards, Standard-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A 
Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches)” in P. S. MENELL & D. SCHWARTZ (eds.), 
Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. II — Analytical Methods (forthcoming 
2019), § II.E-G. 
11 See, e.g., J. FARRELL, ET AL., “Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up”, 74. Antitrust Law Journal 2007, p. 
(603), at 616; M. LEMLEY & C. SHAPIRO, “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking”, 85 Texas Law Journal 2007, p. 
(1991); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: 
Promoting Innovation and Competition 2007, p 34-35. 
12 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
13 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Standards Development Patent Policy Manual 31–85 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 
2007) (detailed catalog of SDO policy terms); M. A. LEMLEY, “Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations”, 90. California Law Review 2002, p. (1889) (survey of SDO policy provisions). 
14 See ABA Patent Policy Manual (n 13), at 56–67. 
15 Am. Standards Assn., Procedures of American Standards Association, Sec. 11 (1959). 
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disclose patents essential to an SDO’s standards because, the court held, the 
SDO’s patent policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining details.”16 
 
Critiques such as this, together with increasing litigation among SDO 
participants, led several prominent SDO to revamp their patent policies in the 
early- and mid-2000s.17 Some of the amendments adopted by SDOs were 
controversial. For example, in 2006 the VMEBus Standards Association (“VITA”) 
amended its patent policy to require advance (ex ante) disclosure of patent 
licensing terms and royalty rates, a requirement that generated significant 
opposition from patent holders.18 Two other SDOs, the European 
Telecommunications Standardisation Institute (ETSI) and the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA), also 
considered such a requirement during this time period but faced significant 
internal opposition and eventually adopted a voluntary, rather than a 
mandatory, ex ante disclosure policy.19 More recently, SDOs have continued to 
experiment with policy changes, most notably in 2015, when IEEE-SA sought to 
clarify certain aspects of its FRAND licensing commitment and limited the right 
of SEP holders to seek injunctive relief against manufacturers of standardized 
products.20 As a result, IPR policies at the most active SDOs in the information 
and communications technology (ICT) sector have become both complex and 
controversial, while at the same time remaining intentionally vague about key 
policy terms such as “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory”. 
 
3. SDO Policy Disputes 
Given the inherent vagueness of most SDO FRAND commitments, parties 
concerned about IPR sometimes disagree over the meaning of such 
commitments. Many of these disagreements relate to the level of royalties that 
may be demanded by a SEP holder in compliance with its FRAND commitment.  
There are countless details regarding the calculation of royalty rates that can 
cause such disagreements, including the appropriate “base” against which the 
royalty is calculated,21 whether different rates should apply to sales in different 
countries, whether adjustments should be made based on the volume sold by the 
manufacturer, and whether the value of the SEP holder’s patents should be 
assessed in light of the overall number of patents covering a standard or on an 
individual basis.  Disagreements also arise over the “non-discrimination” prong 
                                                        
16 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
17 For quantitative analyses of these policy changes, see J.TSAI & J. D. WRIGHT, “Standard Setting, Intellectual 
Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts”, 80 Antitrust Law Journal 
2015, p. (157), at 159–160 and A. LAYNE-FARRAR, “Proactive or Reactive? An Empirical Assessment of IPR 
Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions”, 59. Antitrust Bulletin 2014, p. (373). 
18 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical 
Study”, 53. Jurimetrics 2013, p. (163), at 172–75 (describing the VITA policy amendments). 
19 Ibid. 
20 See M. A. LINDSAY & K. KARACHALIOS, “Updating a Patent Policy: The IEEE Experience”, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle, Mar. 2015. 
21 E.g., is a percentage royalty charged against the price of the end product (e.g., a smartphone) or against 
the chip or component that actually embodies the standardized technology (e.g., the Wi-Fi or radio chip 
used in a smartphone).  In technical terms, the question often posed is whether a SEP holder’s royalty is 
charged against the value of the smallest saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) or the entire market value 
of the end product (EMV).  See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc. (n 12), at 1020. 
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of the FRAND commitment, with parties clashing over whether a SEP holder’s 
charges may vary based on the uses to which the end customer puts a 
standardized product, whether a SEP holder may choose to license only at a 
particular level in the supply chain (e.g., end product manufacturers rather than 
component manufacturers), whether royalty rates may vary based on the size or 
market or country of the manufacturer, and whether a SEP holder has any 
latitude to charge different rates to differently-situated licensees.22   
 
Finally, in addition to the financial terms of SEP licenses, disagreements may 
arise over the appropriateness and scope of various non-financial terms such as 
requirements of reciprocal licensing, mandatory grant-back licenses, and 
defensive suspension.23 The greatest irony of this fractious system is that its goal 
is standardization. And while interoperability and standardization have been 
achieved to a significant degree on the technological front, the policy and legal 
landscape in this area has become increasingly fragmented. 
 
4. Public versus Private Law Enforcement 
 Given this fertile ground for disagreement, an increasing number of formal 
disputes have arisen regarding the meaning of FRAND commitments and a 
growing number of courts and arbitration tribunals around the world have been 
called upon to interpret them.24 In these disputes, a clear intellectual divide has 
emerged over the most suitable legal mechanisms for enforcing such 
commitments. On one hand, if standard setting is a public activity, it may warrant 
traditional “public law” regulation. On the other hand, if standard setting is 
viewed as an inherently private activity, standardization may be more aptly 
regulated through self-policing and private law mechanisms.  
 
A number of governmental enforcement agencies around the world have 
supported the application of competition and antitrust law to police private 
breaches of commitments made within SDOs.25 As the U.S. FTC recently noted, 
“[w]hile not every breach of a FRAND licensing obligation will give rise to 
[antitrust] concerns, when such a breach tends to undermine the standard-
setting process and risks harming American consumers, the public interest 
demands action rather than inaction.”26 An approach to FRAND commitments 
grounded in competition law is also prevalent in Europe, where the dominant 
analysis arises under the competition analysis set out by the CJEU in Huawei v. 
ZTE,27 and where the UK High Court (Patent) in Unwired Planet v. Huawei28 
                                                        
22 See, generally, J. L. CONTRERAS & A. LAYNE-FARRAR, “Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments” in 
CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 186-208. 
23 See, generally, ABA Patent Policy Manual (n 13). 
24 See PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON (n 5) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world).   
25 For an overview of these actions, see J. L. CONTRERAS, “The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition 
Disputes in North America, Europe and Asia” (Apr. 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090.  
26. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, 
FTC File Number 121-0081 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
27 CJEU 16 July 2015, C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477. 
28 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA Civ. 2344 (23 Oct. 2018). 
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evaluated numerous aspects of the SEP holder’s FRAND commitment through a 
lens of competition rather than contract law.29 
 
On the other side of this debate, the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
has recently adopted the position that antitrust enforcement and remedies 
should be used only sparingly in the context of standard setting, and that 
traditional private law remedies such as contract are preferable for policing 
compliance with FRAND commitments.30 Some commentators have also argued 
that private legal remedies (contract and tort) should suffice to redress most 
issues arising in standard setting, and that a resort to public law remedies 
(antitrust) is both unnecessary and counterproductive.31 I, too, believe that while 
antitrust and competition law remedies must remain available to address 
instances of deception and other forms of abusive conduct, the essential 
contours of SDO policies and FRAND commitments, which at their root are 
privately ordered arrangements among parties, can only be discerned through 
the application of private law mechanisms.32 As I have written previously, 
“Despite the public nature of standards development, the most efficient and 
equitable way to resolve disputes regarding the conduct of participants in the 
standardization process may be to focus on the scope and nature of the parties’ 
privately ordered arrangements.”33 That is, the adjudicatory focus should be on 
what the parties actually intended by the language of the commitments that they 
made. Accordingly, the focus of this paper is on the application of private law, 
particularly contract law, to SDO policy interpretation and enforcement. 
 
5. National Law and SDO Policies – The Accidents of Geography 
By their nature as legal entities, most SDOs are established in a particular legal 
jurisdiction.  For example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is 
based in Geneva, Switzerland, the European Telecommunications 
Standardisation Institute (ETSI) is based in Sophia-Antipolis, France, the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) 
is based in New York, New York, USA, and the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) is based in Reston, Virginia, USA.  The foundational legal documents 
establishing each of these SDOs are thus drafted according to the laws of the 
SDO’s home jurisdiction and are often filed with relevant state and national 
business registries.   
 
                                                        
29 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired 
Planet v. Huawei”, 16. Antitrust Source 2017, August 2017.  
30 Asst. Atty. Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. Justice, MAKAN DELRAHIM, “Take it to the Limit: Respecting 
Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law”, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the USC 
Gould School of Law, Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download. 
31. See B. H. KOBAYASHI & J. D. WRIGHT, “Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An 
Application to Patent Holdup”, 5. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2009, p. (469), at 506-516 
(discussing the comparative advantage of tort and contract law in regulating breaches of FRAND 
commitments); see also H. HOVENKAMP, “Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination”, 76. Ohio State 
Law Journal 2015, p. (467), at 555 (“Fundamentally, these are problems best addressed through the patent 
system rather than by antitrust law”). 
32 See J. L. CONTRERAS (n 1). 
33 Ibid, at 230. 
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Likewise, the policy documents setting forth the rules and procedures of each of 
these SDOs purports to be governed by the laws of a particular legal jurisdiction, 
usually the home jurisdiction of the SDO.  Thus, ETSI declares that its IPR policy 
“shall be governed by the laws of France.”34  Other SDOs such as IEEE-SA do not 
specify the particular jurisdiction whose laws govern its policy documents, but 
courts interpreting those documents – particularly U.S. courts -- interpret them 
in accordance with their general understandings of local law. Thus, on top of the 
intricacies of the written rules governing SDO participation, a further layer of 
complexity is introduced by the national and state laws that provide the 
analytical and enforcement framework around these rules. 
 
The application of specific national laws and modes of legal interpretation to 
already complex SDO policies has introduced an additional level of 
unpredictability to the interpretation of SDO policies, particularly surrounding 
FRAND commitments. For example, in Apple v. Motorola, a federal district court 
sitting in Wisconsin was required to determine whether the SEP holder, 
Motorola, violated its contractual obligation to offer a FRAND license to Apple. In 
assessing Motorola’s obligation under IEEE’s patent policy, the court  observed 
that “Neither party undertakes an adequate choice of law analysis with respect 
to claims concerning IEEE, and both sides cite variously to Wisconsin, New York 
and Illinois law in support of their respective positions.”35 To resolve the matter, 
the court determined that there was no conflict among the laws of New York, 
Illinois and Wisconsin with respect to the relevant issues in the case, and thus 
proceeded to apply the laws of Wisconsin, though neither party had any material 
relationship with the state of Wisconsin.36 
 
Even more striking have been the efforts of courts to apply French law to the 
interpretation of ETSI’s patent policy.  In Apple v. Motorola, the same Wisconsin 
court, turning to Motorola’s FRAND obligations under ETSI’s patent policy, based 
its interpretation of French law governing the ETSI policy on a French law 
professor’s affidavit submitted on behalf of one party, and the other party’s 
excerpt from an English language treatise on French contract law.37  With these 
resources in hand, the court appears to rely on the expert’s assertion that French 
law “requires the same general elements” for contract formation as Wisconsin 
law, and makes little effort to apply French statutory law to the case.38 In 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei39, the UK High Court (Patent) makes a significantly 
greater effort to understand and interpret the French law applicable to ETSI’s 
patent policy, thoughtfully probing the arguments of both parties’ experts over 
                                                        
34 ETSI, Rules of Procedure, 29 Nov. 2017, Annex 6, Sec. 12. 
35 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1082 (W.D. Wis. 2012). Interestingly, the state of Wisconsin bore no relationship 
whatsoever to the parties or the case.  The case was originally brought in Illinois, given Motorola’s Chicago 
headquarters.  Yet for case management reasons, the case was bifurcated, with one set of issues (those 
concerning patent infringement) scheduled to be heard by the court in Chicago, and another set of issues 
(those concerning contractual matters) assigned to be heard in the neighboring federal district in 
Wisconsin.   
36 Ibid. 
37 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.   
38 Ibid., at 1083. 
39 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
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many pages of the opinion.40 A similar effort was made by the U.S. district court 
in TCL v. Ericsson based on competing affidavits of the parties’ French law 
experts.41 Yet one must wonder how consistent and accurate these renditions of 
French law in Wisconsin, California and the U.K. can be, especially when based 
on nothing more than the advocacy of paid experts. 
 
U.S. law introduces further complexities to the interpretation and analysis of SDO 
FRAND commitments that do not translate well to other countries.  For example, 
in the U.S. the primary statutory measure of damages for patent infringement is a 
“reasonable royalty”.42 For the past several decades, the calculation of 
reasonable royalty damages in the U.S. has generally followed the 15-factor 
“hypothetical negotiation” framework established in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood Corp.43  Because FRAND commitments speak in terms of a “reasonable” 
royalty, several U.S. courts have sought to determine the appropriate level of 
royalties under a FRAND commitment utilizing traditional methodologies for 
determining patent damages, including the Georgia-Pacific hypothetical 
negotiation framework.  However, because this framework assumes that the 
patent holder and the infringer have no pre-existing relationship, many of the 
assumptions underlying this analysis do not apply in cases involving FRAND-
encumbered SEPs.  This inconsistency has been pointed out in several cases.  In 
Microsoft v. Motorola, for example (in which the Georgia-Pacific analysis was 
applied to a FRAND commitment made to ITU, notwithstanding the fact that ITU 
is a Geneva-based SDO with no acknowledgement of U.S. law), the court 
expressly modified twelve of the Georgia-Pacific factors when conducing its 
FRAND analysis.44 Likewise, in Ericsson v. D-Link, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit criticized the use of several Georgia-Pacific factors when 
calculating royalties subject to a [F]RAND commitment. These criticisms suggest 
that the Georgia-Pacific framework is not well-suited to the determination of 
royalty levels complying with FRAND requirements even with respect to FRAND 
commitments made to U.S. SDOs, let alone non-U.S. SDOs such as ITU and ETSI. 
And, not surprisingly, courts outside the U.S. have not used the Georgia-Pacific 
analysis when interpreting SDO FRAND commitments.  
 
Other examples of potential jurisdictional divergence exist. For example, 
jurisdictions may differ in how they treat a FRAND commitment when the 
original SDO participant that made it transfers the underlying SEP to a third 
party. Do such commitments travel with patents, binding their new owners, or 
are they binding only on the original promisor? Likewise, a SEP holder commits 
to an SDO that it will grant licenses to potential implementers of a standard on 
FRAND terms. But the implementer and SEP holder lack “privity of contract”, so 
if the SEP holder breaches its commitment, the implementer must bring suit 
against the SEP holder as a “third party beneficiary” of the SDO-SEP holder 
commitment.  Under U.S. law, courts have long recognized third party beneficiary 
claims, and at least two federal district courts have adopted this theory with 
                                                        
40 [2017] EWHC 711 at paras 103-146.  
41 TCL v Ericsson (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
42 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
43 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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respect to FRAND commitments.44 However, application of the third-party 
beneficiary doctrine to FRAND commitments presents doctrinal challenges, both 
in the U.S. and elsewhere.45 In fact, several countries have never recognized the 
doctrine, and in the U.K. it has been adopted by statute but was not recognized 
under the common law.46  
 
Given these and other issues, including the fact that some key questions in the 
U.S. are determined by a lay jury, some non-U.S. courts have begun to distance 
themselves from the reasoning of U.S. cases. The most pronounced example of 
this distancing occurs in Unwired Planet, in which the U.K. court expressly rejects 
several touchstones of SDO policy analysis developed in the U.S.  For example, 
both courts47 and enforcement agencies48 in the U.S. have concluded that a 
FRAND royalty should reflect the ex ante value of a patented technology, without 
considering the added value attributable to the adoption of the technology in a 
standard.49 Yet the court in Unwired Planet, while acknowledging these prior 
analyses, expressly parts ways with its U.S. counterparts with little explanation.50 
Similarly, the UK court in Unwired Planet pronounces that there is but a single 
FRAND rate for any given licensing transaction, explicitly deviating from the 
approach taken by the U.S. court in Microsoft v. Motorola, in which a range of 
FRAND rates was determined.51 
 
The national law overlay on SDO-related commitments thus introduces 
numerous inconsistencies to the analysis of SDO policies and FRAND 
commitments.  First, it is often unclear which body of law to apply to a given SDO 
policy. Second, even if there is no disagreement over the correct body of law, the 
interpretation of that law may be based on scant knowledge and experience (e.g., 
applying French law in Wisconsin).  Third, the particular analytical tools of one 
jurisdiction (e.g., the U.S.  Georgia-Pacific framework) will not necessarily be 
                                                        
44Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002–03 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola 
Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
45 For a detailed discussion of the third party beneficiary theory as applied to FRAND commitments, see J. L. 
CONTRERAS, “A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges”, Utah Law 
Review 2015, p.(479) at 508-514. ; J. G. SIDAK, “A FRAND Contract’s Intended Third Party Beneficiary, 1. 
Criterion J. Innovation 2016, p. (1001). Cf. VERBRUGGEN (n 6), at p. 317-320 (discussing difficulty of enforcing 
codes of conduct embodied in supply chain agreements under third party beneficiary theory in the U.S.). 
46 See V. V. PALMER, The Paths to Privity: A History of Third Party Beneficiary Contracts at English Law San 
Francisco: Austin & Winfield 1992), p. 165–167 (1992) and U.K. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999.  See also M.A. EISENBERG, “Third-Party Beneficiaries”, 92. Columbia Law Review 1992, p. 1358, 1364-
1365; J. HALLEBEEK, “Contracts for a Third Party Beneficiary: A Brief Sketch from the Corpus Iuris to Present 
Day Civil Law” (Working Paper 2007), https://research.vu.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/2330470.  
47 Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d at 1232; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 
907 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60233 at *44 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
48 FED. TRADE COMM’N, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition, p. 
22-23 (2011) (“A definition of [F]RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented technology at the time 
the standard is chosen is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition among technologies to be 
incorporated into the standard”). 
49 See, e.g., FARRELL, ET AL. (n 11), at 603. 
50 [2017] EWHC 711, at para 97. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Unwired Planet decision, 
see CONTRERAS (n 29), at 8. 
51 Compare Unwired Planet, [2017] EWHC 711 at para 804(4) with Microsoft v. Motorola, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60233 at *303. The High Court’s ruling on this point was found to be in error on appeal, though not 
because it deviated from the U.S. decisions. [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 at para 121. 
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used in other jurisdictions, even when the same SDO policy is being interpreted. 
And, finally, courts in one jurisdiction may simply differ in their analysis from 
those in other jurisdictions, thus leading to incompatible interpretations of the 
same SDO policy. 
 
6. National Law and Global Markets 
The UK High Court (Patents) in Unwired Planet52 introduced yet another wrinkle 
to the fabric of FRAND adjudication. In that case, Unwired Planet, the holder of 
several SEPs covering 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecom standards, had allegedly 
offered to grant Huawei, a Chinese smartphone manufacturer, a worldwide 
license under those SEPs.  Huawei challenged the reasonableness of Unwired 
Planet’s licensing offer and the parties commenced litigation in several countries, 
including the UK.  In the UK case, Huawei argued that it only wished to obtain a 
license under Unwired Planet’s UK patents,53 and that Unwired Planet’s 
insistence on a worldwide license was unreasonable.   
 
In evaluating the reasonableness of Unwired Planet’s proffered license, the UK 
court first observed that “the vast majority” of SEP licenses in the wireless 
telecom industry, including all of the comparable licenses introduced at trial, 
were granted on a worldwide basis, with only occasional exclusions.54  Against 
this backdrop, the court reasoned that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably 
and on a willing basis would agree on a worldwide licence”.55  In contrast, the 
court found that country-by-country licensing, as proposed by Huawei, would be 
extremely inefficient if not “madness”.56  Accordingly, the court ruled that, in this 
case, a FRAND license was necessarily a worldwide license and that if Huawei did 
not enter into a license agreement on the global FRAND terms dictated by the 
court, it would suffer the entry of an injunction in the UK (a sizable market).57 
Once Huawei enters into that license agreement, it will be licensed across the 
entire world at the rates set by the UK court. No further licenses will be needed, 
and proceedings in all other jurisdictions will effectively be mooted. 
 
The UK court’s decision in Unwired Planet raises the very real possibility that 
national courts will feel increasingly entitled to set royalty rates for SEPs across 
the globe. The implications of this trend could be material, as high stakes patent 
litigation today is an inherently global enterprise with parallel actions brought in 
a dozen or more jurisdictions.58 This localized power to affect global commercial 
                                                        
52 [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017). 
53 Id. at para 524. 
54 Ibid, at para 534.  Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China. 
55 Ibid,at para 543. 
56 Ibid, at para 543. 
57 Ibid, at para 572, 807(18). A similar result was reached by the Landgericht Düsseldorf in Saint Lawrence 
Communications v. Vodafone, Landgericht Düsseldorf 4a O 73/14, 4a O126/14, 4a O 127/14, 4a O 128/14, 
4a O 129/14, 4a O 130/14, 31 March 2016. In Vodafone, the SEP holder also offered the implementer a 
worldwide license, which requested instead a n national license.  In evaluating the SEP holder’s conduct 
under Huawei v. ZTE, the lower court held that the offer for a worldwide license was FRAND compliant.  See 
Robin Jacob & Alexander Milner, Lessons from Huawei v. ZTE, 4iP Council Research Report, Oct. 2016, at 10, 
http://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-research-4ip-council-lessons-huawei-v-zte. 
58 See, e.g., J. ELLIS, “Vringo and ZTE Go the Distance: An Infographic”, Intell. Asset Mgmt. Blog (Dec. 15, 
2015), https://perma.cc/2MUJ-YY63 (describing litigation between Vringo and ZTE in twelve different 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369599 
12 
 
 
Tilburg Institute for Private Law. This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Social 
Science Research Network http://www.ssrn.com/link/Tilburg-Private-Law.html 
 
relationships could embolden courts in particular jurisdictions to seek to attract 
litigants based on their interpretations of certain key SDO policy provisions. 
Thus, the interpretations of some jurisdictions might favor SEP holders, 
attracting them to the courts of that jurisdiction much as U.S. patent holders 
were once attracted to the patent-friendly District Court for the Eastern District 
of Texas,59 and European patent holders are attracted to Germany, where 
injunctive relief will often be granted in an expedited proceeding before patent 
validity is adjudicated.60  By the same token, jurisdictions that gain reputations 
for favoring implementers over SEP holders may find a dearth of SEP holders 
seeking adjudication in their courts, but perhaps an increase in claims by 
manufacturers of standardized products.  
 
This state of affairs can lead to what is termed a “race to the courthouse”, as 
litigants rush to file suit in the jurisdiction most favorable to their position.  The 
stakes in such races become even greater when any one court having jurisdiction 
over the parties may issue an order (a so-called “anti-suit injunction”) 
prohibiting the parties from maintaining an action in any other jurisdiction until 
the issuing court has reached a decision.61 In effect, any country whose market is 
large enough that the manufacturer is not willing to sacrifice it via an injunction 
could leverage the threat of an injunction to force parties to enter into a global 
agreement on the terms that its courts dictate. 
 
These considerations may also shape the behavior of courts and institutions 
within jurisdictions to mold their rules and procedure to attract litigation in a 
“race to the bottom”.62 Thus, the potential for inconsistent judicial 
interpretations of SDO policy provisions is likely to lead both to an unproductive 
race to the courthouse among litigants and a race to the bottom among 
jurisdictions. 
 
7. A Lack of Precedent and Predictability 
In today’s global economy, product markets span the globe and worldwide 
product interoperability is increasingly expected in fields such as computing, 
                                                                                                                                                              
jurisdictions), K. EICHENWALD, “The Great Smartphone War”, Vanity Fair, May 3, 2014, 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war (describing 
litigation between Apple and Samsung across a dozen jurisdictions). 
59 See, e.g., B. J. LOVE & J. YOON, “Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern 
District of Texas”, 20. Stanford Technology Law Review 2017, p. (1). The peculiar dominance of the E.D.Tex. 
in U.S. patent litigation may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 581 U.S. (2017).  See R. DAVIS, “What We Know about Patent 
Venue Post-TC Heartland”, Law360, May 23, 2018. 
60 The readiness of German courts to issue injunctions to patent holders was tempered somewhat in the 
case of SEPs subject to FRAND commitments by the Court of Justice of the EU in Huawei v. ZTE (n 27), in 
which a SEP holder may be found to abuse its dominant position in violation of TFEU 102 if it seeks to 
obtain an injunction when enforcing a FRAND-encumbered SEP without following a specified set of 
procedural steps outlined by the CJEU. 
61 See J. L. CONTRERAS & M. A. EIXENBERGER, “The Anti-Suit Injunction – A Transnational Remedy for Multi-
Jurisdictional SEP Litigation” in CONTRERAS (n 3), pp. 451-459 (describing anti-suit injunctions in Microsoft v. 
Motorola, Vringo v. ZTE and TCL v. Ericsson). 
62 See, e.g., D. J. H. GREENWOOD, “Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top”, 23. Yale 
Law & Policy Review, Issue 2, Art. 2 (2005) (discussing the view that the U.S. state Delaware adjusted its 
corporate law to attract business incorporations). For a more detailed discussion of the potential impact of 
these developments on global markets, see CONTRERAS (n 29). 
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networking, content distribution and telecommunications.  The SDOs that 
develop standards to enable this degree of interoperability, by default, must 
operate internationally.  Their participants come from dozens of countries 
around the world, particularly North America, Europe, Oceana, and Asia.63 In 
many cases, the same individuals participate on behalf of their employers in 
multiple SDOs developing similar technologies.  Even SDOs such as ETSI, which 
began as projects of regional or national governments have, by necessity, 
expanded to encompass an international membership. 
 
The physical headquarters location of SDOs has thus become increasingly 
irrelevant to their operation and policy making.  Why should the fact that one 
SDO is legally based in New York and another is legally based in Geneva affect 
the interpretation and enforcement of commitments made by the same 
individuals on behalf of the same firms acting in the same technology space with 
respect to the very same end products? 
 
The examples discussed above illustrate that the national and state private law 
mechanisms that purport to govern SDO patent policies are inconsistent and 
sometimes at odds with one another. The result has been an interpretive 
patchwork that allows room for opportunistic parties to engage in forum 
shopping and makes planning more difficult for everyone else.  Moreover, given 
the different approaches taken by different jurisdictions to these issues, an 
adjudication in one jurisdiction relating to a FRAND commitment is not likely to 
assist with interpretation of that same commitment in another jurisdiction. 
Given the global nature of markets for standardized products, this fragmentation 
along national and state boundaries is particularly problematic. 
 
What’s more, there is not even predictable interpretation of identical policy 
provisions from one SDO to the next, even within the same country.  That is, each 
SDO purports to be an independent organization with a unique set of governing 
documents and policies.  As such, most SDOs feel free to disregard guidance and 
interpretations of policy provisions that are issued by other SDOs.  Some SDOs, in 
fact, vehemently defend their independence in declining to follow the 
interpretive lead of other SDOs, even where identical policy language is 
concerned.  
 
Can this fragmentation be efficient? Why should the term “non-discriminatory” 
have different meanings depending on whether an SDO is based in New York or 
Sophia-Antipolis, or whether the court adjudicating that meaning is located in 
London or Milwaukee?  This divergence is particularly senseless when the same 
individuals interact at these different SDOs on a regular basis. A lack of 
consistency in the interpretation of common SDO provisions, even non-
controversial ones, lends less predictability to the ordering of private affairs. The 
lack of consistent understandings of SDO policy provisions may give rise to more 
disputes regarding policy interpretation and result in less certainty regarding 
                                                        
63 See, e.g., J. L. CONTRERAS, “Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and 
China”, 38. Telecommunications Policy 2004, p. (916) (describing globalization of Internet standardization 
and increasing engagement of Asian firms). 
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the outcome of disputes. All of these lead to higher transaction and litigation 
costs, thus disadvantaging smaller players.64 
 
Finally, it seems unlikely that this fragmented system can accurately reflect the 
understanding of individual SDO participants. Is it possible that these individuals 
adjust their behavior depending on the interpretations given to nearly identical 
SDO rules country by country, organization by organization?  This cannot be the 
way that individual SDO participants conduct themselves, yet this is the reality 
imposed on them and their employers by the fragmented nature of private law 
mechanisms that guide interpretation of SDO policies. 
 
8. A Lex Mercatoria for Standardization? 
Let us conduct a thought experiment.  Suppose that two engineers, call them 
Jacques and Mary, employed by different firms, each participate in two SDOs, one 
based in the U.S. and the other based in France. The patent policies of these SDOs 
are relatively similar.  Further suppose that neither Jacques nor Mary is an 
attorney or an expert in legal doctrine, but that each of them has many years of 
experience developing technical standards and some familiarity with both the 
principles of patent law and his or her own employer’s policies relating to 
patents. Assuming that neither Jacques and Mary, nor their companies, are at the 
moment embroiled in a dispute and view each other relatively neutrally, what 
can we assume about their understanding of the SDOs’ policies relating to certain 
topics?   
 
Let us first consider the less controversial topics raised above. Would Jacques 
and Mary agree that a FRAND commitment made with respect to a patent should 
continue if the patent is sold to a new owner?  While nothing is certain, it is likely 
that they would agree that the FRAND commitment should, indeed, travel with 
the patent, even if they know nothing about competition law or the law of 
property servitudes. What about the ability of a third party who is not an SDO 
member to enforce a FRAND commitment against a SEP holder?  Again, it is 
likely that our two engineer friends would agree that the implementer should be 
able to insist that a SEP holder grant it a license on FRAND terms, even if they 
know nothing about the convoluted law surrounding privity of contract or third 
party contractual beneficiaries.  
 
What about a more controversial topic? For example, the non-discrimination 
prong of the FRAND commitment.  Would they agree that charging one 
implementer $0.05 per unit and another implementer $0.01 per unit for a license 
is discriminatory?  Perhaps they would.  Or perhaps they, being thoughtful 
engineers, would want to know more, such as the relative sizes or unit volumes 
                                                        
64 This is not to say, however, that SDOs should not be encouraged to experiment with their IPR policies. 
Policy experimentation is a useful method for adapting policy terms to evolving needs of the industry.  See, 
e.g., BARTLEY (n 4), at 524 (“Private regulation may also be conceptualized as a laboratory of standards and 
benchmarks to later be institutionalized in government regulation and law, another possible form of 
complementarity” (citing C. F. SABEL & J. ZEITLIN, “Learning From Difference: The New  Architectures of 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union”, 14. European Law Journal 2008, p. (271). Rather, the 
critique of this article is differing external interpretations of the same policy provisions adopted by different 
SDOs. 
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sold by these two implementers, or whether their products serve different 
markets (e.g., wireless connectivity in offices versus automobiles).  Depending on 
the answers to these questions, they might or might not agree on a common 
position.65 
 
From the answers to these questions, we can sequentially build up a common 
body of understanding between Jacques and Mary as to many, but not all, issues.  
It is likely that if more engineers, also from different firms, were asked, some of 
them would agree with some of the common understandings of Jacques and 
Mary.  As a result, we could, in theory, develop a body of policy understandings 
that is common across a large swath of the relevant stakeholders in the 
standards-development community.66 
 
This set of common understandings could be considered a sort of lex mercatoria 
– a system of rules administered and interpreted not by national and state 
courts, but by the expert practitioners of a particular trade.67 As such, the 
common understanding of these policy provisions would supersede legal 
interpretations imposed by national or state law.  In fact, it would be reasonable 
for legal tribunals to defer to such common trade understandings, as is 
frequently done in the commercial context.68 
 
What’s more, if we conceptualize the set of policy rules enabling the 
development of standards across the globe as an interconnected network rather 
than a multiplicity of isolated nodes, we can begin to adopt learning and 
interpretation across SDOs, rather than compartmentalizing the interpretive 
activity of each SDO within itself.  Thus, an SDO that gives meaning to a term not 
previously debated can, at minimum, influence the interpretive act of other SDOs 
in the network and, at most, serve as a precedent directly bearing on other SDOs’ 
interpretation.  
 
Of course, as noted above, uniformity will not be achievable as to every SDO 
policy provision, and some contentious issues, such as the appropriate base for 
FRAND royalty calculations, may remain disputed across SDOs.  As a result, 
different SDOs may adopt different meanings for these disputed terms through 
whatever internal voting and consensus procedures they wish.  Nevertheless, it 
is likely that there is a significant body of SDO policy provisions that do not suffer 
                                                        
65 An actual example of SDO divergence on a controversial topic can be found with respect to the definition 
of FRAND. As noted above, IEEE enacted policy amendments in 2015 which seek to clarify several aspects of 
its participants’ FRAND commitments including the appropriate royalty base (SSPPU should be considered).  
In contrast, CEN-CENELEC in recent policy guidelines has expressly declined to offer such interpretive 
advice, taking the position instead that FRAND is a mere ‘comity device’ which cannot be specified in 
advance. 
66 For a discussion of the development of common understandings through the mechanism of “shared 
meaning analysis” in the context of consumer contracts, see R. B. KAR & M. J. RADIN, “Pseudo-Contract & 
Shared Meaning Analysis”, 132. Harvard Law Review 2019, p.(1135). 
67 See, generally, H. J. BERMAN & C. KAUFMAN, “The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria)”, 19. Harvard International Law Journal 1978, p. (221) (discussing origins and contemporary 
application of lex mercatoria). 
68 See L. L. JAFFE, "Law Making by Private Groups", 51. Harvard Law Review 1937, p. (201), at 213 (describing 
how courts adopted customs and usages of merchants in adjudicating commercial transactions).   
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from broad disagreement, and which could form the basis for a standardization 
lex mercatoria. 
 
9. Role of a lex mercatoria? 
It is worth emphasizing that the envisioned lex mercatoria for standardization is 
not intended to be a replacement for judicial or arbitral resolution of FRAND 
disputes, but as a tool that can be employed by courts and arbitral tribunals in 
resolving such disputes.  Courts have, in the past, given weight to the intentions 
of SDO participants when interpreting policy language that was ambiguous.  In 
some cases, participant understandings have even superseded the plain meaning 
of policy language that did not reflect widely-held norms.69 The lex mercatoria of 
standardization, were it to be adopted, could more easily enable adjudicators to 
determine, without resort to national law, whether particular duties and 
practices are imposed by SDO policies, clearing the way for them to evaluate 
individual conduct in light of those common rules in a more consistent and 
efficient manner. 
 
This being said, a common set of understandings codified into a lex is not the 
only way that greater consistency and predictability could be achieved in an 
international setting.  On the contrary. Greater harmonization of national judicial 
interpretations could also serve this purpose, as could deference among national 
courts to decisions made in other jurisdictions (akin to the international 
recognition of arbitral awards under the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.70 But, as desirable as 
these international comity measures might be, such coordination does not 
appear to be on the horizon in today’s political environment.  Moreover, the 
bringing together of national judicial approaches has far broader implications 
than standardization and FRAND licensing.  As such, it is suggested that the lex 
mercatoria proposal in this paper, which concerns only the world of technical 
standard setting, is far more modest than a call for broad systemic change at a 
global level. 
 
10. Codification and Implementation  
The above discussion begs the question, of course, who would develop such a lex 
mercatoria, and under what circumstances?  Who are Jacques and Mary, and how 
might we persuade them to engage in the exercise of codifying their common 
understandings?  As Cremades and Plehn observe, there are two basic 
approaches to the establishment of a new international legal regime: the 
harmonization of existing national laws, and the development of a new, 
autonomous body of law.71 The harmonization approach has been used with 
                                                        
69 See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (literal reading of SDO policy 
resulted in no duty of disclosure on SDO members, but testimony of various SDO participants showed that 
even without a formal disclosure requirement, SDO participants shared a common understanding that they 
should disclose patents necessary to practice the SDO’s standards, resulting in a legal duty); Qualcomm Inc. 
v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding similar duty to disclose patents based on 
informal norms and expectations of SDO participants). See also CONTRERAS (n.1) at 218-220. 
70 U.N. Comm. on Intl. Trade Law, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York, 1958). 
71 See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 321. 
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varying degrees of success in the area of intellectual property law.  Broadly 
adopted treaties such as the TRIPS Agreement72 have shaped the IP laws of most 
developed countries, but the process of negotiating an international treaty is 
complex, lengthy and resource-intensive, and has only become more so in recent 
years.  Accordingly, this approach is not recommended in the current instance. 
 
Looking to the roots of the lex mercatoria itself – the customary code of merchant 
law – we find the development of an autonomous body of doctrine that existed 
independently of formal law.  Its origins have been traced to the organized 
mercantile markets and fairs that began to emerge in eleventh century Europe.73  
The  body of commercial practices and norms developed by merchants in their 
transactions diverged in important ways from then-existing legal doctrines, but 
were widely observed among transacting parties.74 Eventually, the norms 
developed by these private actors were recognized by courts in adjudicating 
disputes: first among merchants and then in commercial transactions more 
broadly.75 Numerous other examples of such private transactional codes have 
been studied, including those adopted by Hassidic diamond wholesalers,76 
Memphis cotton merchants,77 credit rating agencies,78 and Internet technology 
users,79 to name just a few. 
 
These examples suggest that for a private code to achieve both acceptance and 
legitimacy in the eyes of both its adherents and the broader legal system, it 
should be developed and adopted organically by those to whom it is applied, as 
opposed to some external body.80  Accordingly, the proposed lex mercatoria of 
standardization should arise from the usage and custom of the standards-
development community.  In fact, as illustrated by the example of Jacques and 
Mary in the previous Section, it is likely that this common understanding already 
exists in practice, and merely requires codification to be preserved and utilized 
effectively by courts, arbitrators and other adjudicatory bodies.  
 
This being said, industry custom cannot be the only criteria by which a private 
code is judged.  The question of legitimacy is particularly important if a private 
code of conduct is to be adopted by the legal system.  Without a doubt, there are 
private codes that may govern behavior of their adherents (e.g., the Sicilian 
                                                        
72 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1995). 
73 See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 318 fn.2 (collecting historical references); BERMAN & KAUFMAN (n 67), at 225. 
74 See CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 319.  
75 See BERMAN & KAUFMAN (n 67), at 226; JAFFE (n 68), at 213; CREMADES & PLEHN (n 7), at 319-20. 
76 L. BERNSTEIN, “Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry”, 
21. Journal of Legal Studies 1992, p. (115). 
77 L. BERNSTEIN, “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions”, 99. Michigan Law Review 2001, p. (1724). 
78 S. L. SCHWARCZ, “Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox”, University of Illinois Law 
Review 2002, p. (1). 
79 See M. A. LEMLEY, “The Law and Economics of Internet Norms”, 73. Chicago-Kent Law Review 1998, p. 
(1257), 1263-1264. 
80 It is worth noting that while the standards engineers who would contribute to a lex mercatoria are, to a 
large degree, technically sophisticated, the instant proposal is not one of expert, technocratic regulation, 
which is a subject of some debate. See, e.g., C. M. RADAELLI, Technocracy in the European Union (London: 
Routledge 1999). In this case, it is merely coincidental that the regulated group itself consists largely of 
“technocratic” individuals. 
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Mafia’s unwritten “omerta” code of silence), but which are viewed as illegitimate 
by society more broadly, not to mention the legal system.81 Clearly, in order to 
achieve external legitimacy, a private code must hew to applicable legal rules 
and norms. As noted by Jaffe, such codes must be “pronounced by a court to be 
‘reasonable’ and comfortable to the general law” and cannot simply reflect the 
desires of private actors.82 
 
In the context of open source code software, Dan Wielsch has observed a 
concerted effort by the open source community to embody a set of “peculiar 
ethical imperatives” into the licensing agreements promulgated by the Free 
Software Foundation (FSF).83 The FSF’s gesture toward a transnational lex 
contractus is deliberate, Wielsch argues, as it “uses a vocabulary that deliberately 
eschews terms of art in international copyright law in order to avoid the 
importation of system-specific legal assumption” and instead adopts “a language 
that incorporates and faithfully conveys the normativity of technological 
engineering projects.”84 
 
Who, then, can be trusted with the codification effort in the context of technical 
standards?  Could a particular SDO play the role that FSF has played with regard 
to the open source community?  Probably not. As noted above, there is a 
diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds within SDOs, making it more likely that 
true industry consensus would only be achieved through an effort that spanned 
SDOs.  Moreover, the act of codification is, at heart, a legal activity, so it would be 
preferable for the codification effort to include at least some participants with 
legal backgrounds. These considerations point to an industry activity organized 
by a neutral body that has at least some level of legal capability. 
 
Who, then, can be trusted with this codification effort?  A particular SDO?  
Probably not. As noted above, there is a diversity of viewpoints and backgrounds 
within SDOs, making it more likely that true industry consensus would be 
achieved through an effort that spanned SDOs.  Moreover, the act of codification 
is, at heart, a legal activity, so it would be preferable for the codification effort to 
include at least some participants with legal backgrounds. These considerations 
point to an industry activity organized by a neutral body that has at least some 
level of legal credibility. 
 
Neutrality is particularly important for the codifying body, as the proposed lex 
mercatoria would, in some ways, supersede decision making by the 
democratically sanctioned national judiciary. As such, the lex should not be 
biased toward any particular industry position, but should embody only those 
positions that reflect broad consensus within the standardization community. 
Capture of the codifying body by particular interests (e.g., by firms that primarily 
seek to monetize patent assets, or by firms that primarily manufacture products 
                                                        
81 See, e.g., C. J. MILHAUPT & M. D. WEST, “The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical 
Analysis of Organized Crime”, 67. University of Chicago Law Review 2000, p. (41).  
82 JAFFE (n 68), at 214. 
83 D. WIELSCH, “Contract Interpretation Regimes”, 81. Modern Law Review 2018, p. (958), at 985. 
84 Ibid., at 986. 
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without R&D effort) would seriously compromise the perceived validity and 
acceptability of the resulting code. 
 
Examples of bodies that might be both qualified and neutral in this regard 
include the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which recently 
developed a set of arbitral procedures for FRAND disputes,85 the American Bar 
Association (ABA), which has developed an annotated set of SDO policy 
provisions,86 and the International Chamber of Commerce, which developed the 
international commercial code known as INCOTERMS.87  Each of these bodies 
appears to possess the necessary levels of expertise, industry contacts and, at 
least in some respects, neutrality, to lead the codification effort.88 
 
One important feature of the lex mercatoria approach is that, once developed, it 
need not be formally adopted or approved by SDOs, which in many cases have 
proven to be contentious and mired in internal debate.  Rather, the lex can exist 
outside of any particular SDO, and can be available for reference by SDOs that are 
interested.  Of course, any SDO that strongly opposes a term or definition 
contained in the lex can adopt a policy statement affirmatively rejecting that 
term or definition, or adopting a contrary meaning of its own. But doing so does 
not diminish the value of the lex. In fact, the existence of such contrary 
statements by dissenting SDOs could serve to strengthen the force of the lex 
among the larger group of non-dissenting SDOs.  And, if enough SDOs and SDO 
participants object to a particular term in the lex, there should be some way to 
revise or strike the term as inconsistent with a broad industry understanding. 
 
Another pertinent question is how such a lex mercatoria would be used once 
developed.  It could intervene in the legal system in a number of ways: as a more 
or less authoritative input to existing adjudicatory processes, or as a body of 
adjudicative principles of its own, administered and enforced outside national 
judicial processes, perhaps through an industry-based transnational tribunal of 
some kind.89  In the former case, of course, enforcement by national courts again 
gives rise to the possibility of divergent application of even the common 
vocabulary established by the lex mercatoria, but perhaps at least some degree of 
consistency can be achieved for the most vexing doctrinal debates in this area.  
After all, the historical adoption of the original lex mercatoria by English courts 
in the eighteenth century and the tendency of modern courts to defer to 
commercial practices such as the definitions offered by INCOTERMS indicate that 
                                                        
85See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO ADR for FRAND Disputes, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/ict/frand/ (visited Jul. 9, 2018). 
86 ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL (n 13) (the author led this project). 
87 INCOTERMS is a good example of an industry-generated code that is adopted and referenced by courts 
around the world.  It consists of a set of defined commercial terms specifying the delivery, payment and 
insurance obligations of parties to commercial shipping arrangements.  See, generally, J. RAMBERG, 
INCOTERMS 2010, 13. European Journal of Law Reform 2011, p. (380). 
88 A significant practical question may be precisely how such an activity would be funded, but this point is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
89 See J. L. CONTRERAS, “Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?” 94. Washington Law 
Review 2019, forthcoming, (prepublication available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3253954). 
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courts may, under the right circumstances, permit private actors to establish the 
terms of their commercial interactions. 
 
Even more promising is the prospect of truly international enforcement and 
adjudication of such SDO-related disputes, a situation that is partially achieved 
through current international arbitration, albeit in a private and non-transparent 
manner.90 The author has proposed such a system, at least for the determination 
of FRAND royalty rates on a global basis.91  But the actual implementation of 
such a system is less important than the vision of a unified body of policy that it 
invites.  
 
11. Conclusion 
Technical standardization plays an important role in the global economy, yet the 
rules that govern this activity are subject to inconsistent interpretations by 
different national courts leading to market inefficiencies.  Given the increasing 
divergence of national and organizational policy interpretations and 
understandings in the standardization world, a common base of understanding 
driven by SDO participants rather than courts and policy makers could be an 
attractive solution. Such a lex mercatoria of standardization could serve as an 
input to national courts as well as international arbitral tribunals, providing a 
consensus view of certain debated SDO policy provisions that is independent of 
the vagaries of national law.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
90 See ibid (discussing weaknesses in current arbitral resolution of FRAND disputes). 
91 See ibid. 
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